. Stock of international debt securities in US$ billion, percentage of total and percentage of GDP by Latin American country (2000-2007, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016 and first quarter of 2017).
In Table 2 . South American stock of debt securities of the nonfinancial corporate sector in US$ billion, percentage of total and percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) . Source: Bank for International Settlements (2016a , 2016b ) and World Bank (2017 .
government is the most important issuer of international debt. 3 However, its importance has declined over time. Between the period 2000-2007 and the year 2017, the share of government debt as a percentage of the total declined from 70.8% to 39.8% at the regional level. In the cases of South America and Central America, the stock of government debt decreased from 71.5% to 44.7% and from 89% to 57.2%, respectively.
A second stylized fact is the rapid rise in importance of the debt of the financial and, more prominently, nonfinancial corporate sector. The stock of international debt securities of the financial sector rose, on average, from US$47 billion to US$241 billion between 2000-2007 and 2017 . The decomposition between the private and public financial sectors shows that the former explains the bulk of the rise in debt (US$41 billion and US$216 billion, respectively; see Table 1 ).
For its part, at the regional level, the stock of debt of the nonfinancial corporate sector expanded from US$49 billion to US$289 billion for the period between 2000-2007 and 2017 . The stock of corporate debt is more important for South America than Central America. In the case of the latter, the share of the debt stock of the nonfinancial corporate sector increased from 2.0% to 6.8%, whereas the debt stock as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 1.6 percent to 1.3 percent for the same period. For South America, the importance of the debt of the nonfinancial corporate sector is reflected in the rise of both its relative share and as a percentage of GDP (12.2% to 25% and from 2.4% to 4.0% between 2000-2007 and 2017, respectively) .
The countries that are most exposed to corporate debt in the international bond market include Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Available data between 2000 and 2015 shows that for Mexico the stock of debt of the nonfinancial corporate sector increased from 3.1% to 11.9% of GDP. For the same years the stock of debt of the nonfinancial corporate sector expanded in Brazil (2.2% to 8.5%), Chile (3.3% to 16.1%), Colombia (1% to 6.3%), and Peru (0% to 4.9%).
Other countries in South America, such as Argentina and Paraguay, have, in comparative terms, smaller corporate debt ratios (1.4% and 1.1% of GDP for 2015, respectively), whereas Uruguay has no corporate debt (Table 2) .
Data sample and description
The analysis in the article focuses on the public and private nonfinancial corporate sector in six South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). These countries account for over 85% of the 3 The government includes local, central, and regional governments, and social security funds. It excludes the central banks and publicly owned firms; see BIS (2016) .
regional GDP and the gross formation of fixed capital. Data at the firm level for these countries was obtained from Bloomberg Data Services for the period 2009-2016. Firm-level data are reported on the basis of residence and this provides a key justification for carrying out the analysis at the sector rather than country level. Also the dataset includes parent companies and excludes all subsidiaries. Not all the firms report data on a systematic basis; however we assume that all the firms included in the sample were active during some time in the period.
All the variables correspond to annual values on a calendar-year basis, expressed in current U.S. dollars. All the percentages used for a given period/year are expressed in terms of all the firms that report data for that period/year. The data presenting significant/persistent missing value problems were eliminated.
We distinguish between the firms that issue debt in the international bond market from those that do not. We identified the firms that issue debt in the international bond market on the basis of information provided by Latin Finance and Bloomberg.
Our final sample consists of a total of 2,241 listed firms in 34 sectors of economic activity according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).
4 A large percentage of these firms are located in Brazil and Mexico (57% and 10% of the total, respectively) and to a lesser extent in Peru and Chile (11% of the total for both countries).
The available evidence (Table 3) shows that the number of firms that issued bonds in the international market represents a small part of the total for Argentina (8.9%), Brazil (2.1%), Chile (7.9%), Colombia (7.6%), Mexico (10.5%), and Peru (7.3%). However, this subset of firms accounts for a large share of total assets and especially of total expenditure on fixed assets and long-term investment. On average, bond-issuing firms represent 33.9% of total assets, 35% of expenditure on short-term investment, and 40.8% of expenditure on long-term investment.
In line with these results, the analysis at the sector level (Table 4) shows that of the 34 sectors considered, 26 sectors (or 76% of the total) include firms that issue bonds. The sectors that do not issue bonds (as reported in Bloomberg) include alternative energy, electronic and electrical equipment, health care equipment and services, leisure goods, pharmaceutical and biotechnology, software and computer services, support services, technology hardware and equipment, and tobacco.
4
The ICB is a system that classifies both domestic and international stocks. The ICB has a four-tier, hierarchical industry classification structure. It uses a system of 10 industries, partitioned into 18 supersectors, which are further divided into 41 sectors, of which 33 sectors belong to the nonfinancial corporate sector. The 34th sector included in the article includes those firms that are not classified in the rest of the sectors.
Also, the number of firms that issue bonds represents a small share of the total for each sector. The largest share of firms issuing bonds is located in the oil and gas industry (12% of the total for oil and gas producers and 13.3% of the total for oil equipment, services, and distribution) and aerospace and defense (14.3% of the total). The lowest share of bond-issuing firms is found in mobile telecommunications (1.3% of the total) and general retailers (1.9% of the total).
Bond-issuing firms in aerospace and defense (94.5% and 93.1%), mobile telecommunications (45.9% and 48.7%), travel and leisure (31.7% and 35.5%), forestry and paper (31.5% and 33.2%), electricity (31% and 50.9%), industrial metals and mining (24.6% and 29.2%), food and drug retailers (21.0% and 28.4%), and oil and gas producers (19.4% and 17.6%) have the largest share of fixed assets and long-term investment, respectively.
The lowest shares of fixed assets and long-term investment are, respectively, found among general retailers (1.6% and 1.3% of the total) and personal goods (1.0% and 0.3% of the total).
A financial analysis of corporate indebtedness
To gain a general understanding of the financial situation of the nonfinancial corporate sector in those countries that have the greatest exposure to the international bond market, financial indicators that assess the state of liquidity (the quick ratio or QR), solvency (interest coverage ratio, debt-toequity ratio, and short-term-debt-to-total-debt ratio), profitability (rate of return over equity, [ROE ¼
Net Income
Equity ]), and net profit margin were computed for each of the firms included in the sample, including bond-issuing and nonbond-issuing firms. Table 5 shows the median value of each of the financial ratios on a yearly basis for the period 2009-2016. Table 6 shows the percentage of total bond-issuing and nonbond-issuing firms that, depending on the case, are either above or below their average value for the period 2010-2016 for each financial ratio. 5 Table 7 shows the results of the same exercise as Table 5 but using the established a priori threshold levels found in the literature rather than the indicators' own median values.
The evidence presented in Tables 5-7 reveals a deteriorating performance of the nonfinancial sector, reflected mainly in a rise in leverage and a decline in profitability. This stylized fact is more prominent among bondissuing firms relative to nonbond-issuing firms. Bond-issuing firms also exhibit worse performance in terms of the QR. We detail below the findings for the different indicators.
The liquidity indicator (QR)
Liquidity indicators reflect the ability of a firm to pay its short-term liabilities. The QR, also known as the acid test ratio, considers only the most liquid assets (assets minus inventories) as a measure of the capacity of a We did not include 2009 because it is the year in which the GFC was felt in Latin America and its inclusion could distort the results.
company to confront its short-term obligations. 6 It is traditionally considered that a QR equal to or more than one means that firms are able to meet their short-term obligations, while values of the QR below 1 are an indicator of the opposite.
The evidence for the period running from 2009 to 2016 shows that firms (whether bond-issuing or nonbond-issuing firms) have maintained, on average, a QR that is equal to 1 (Table 5 ). The percentage of firms whose QRs are below the median is practically the same for bond-issuing and nonbond-issuing firms.
The percentage of total firms whose QR is below one remained at roughly 50% of the total throughout the period; a similar evolution is Source: Authors' own estimates on the basis of Bloomberg (2017). Ã Percentage of total firms whose quick ratio (QR) and interest coverage ratio are below the median. ÃÃ Percentage of firms whose debt-to-equity ratios are above the median. ÃÃÃ Percentage of firms that have a ratio of short-term to total debt and current assets to total assets above the median. ÃÃÃÃ Percentage of firms that have a ROE and a net profit margin below their respective medians. The percentages were obtained on the basis of firms that have the required data.
6
Other liquidity indicators include the liquidity ratio and the cash ratio. The liquidity ratio measures the ability of a firm to cover its short-term debt obligations with its current assets (i.e., those that can be converted into cash within a short time period). The cash ratio shortens further the period of time by considering only cash and cash equivalents (e.g., marketable securities). In this sense, the cash ratio is an extreme version of a liquidity ratio and can reflect the value of a firm under the worst-case scenario (bankruptcy).
recorded for nonbond-issuing firms. In the case of bond-issuing firms, the percentage of firms whose QR is below one increased from 44% to 52% of the total.
Debt-to-equity ratio
Solvency ratios, such as the debt-to-equity ratio, measure the ability of a company to cover its long-term obligations. Solvency ratios show the extent to which a firm depends on borrowing to finance its productive activity.
Borrowing is compared to assets and/or equity. There is no absolute threshold for the debt-to-equity ratio These can vary widely depending on the phase of the business cycle, country size, levels of development, and the type of productive activity a firm undertakes (debt-to-equity ratios tend to be higher for manufacturing and industry than for, say, services). The evidence in the case of Europe shows that the ratio of total assets to debt reached 36.2% in 1999, peaking at 46.2% in 2009 (during the GFC) and decreased to 43% in 2011 (ECB 2012) .
7 A more recent study that includes a set of 618,000 firms operating in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Slovenia for the period 2005-14 finds that the debt-to-financial-assets ratio averages 0.48 (0.45 for the median) with a standard deviation of 0.3 (Gebauer, Setzer, and Westphal 2017) . Gebauer et al. (2017) identified thresholds for the debt-to-asset ratio of 80-85% which they term overleveraging. Overleveraging refers to a situation where indebtedness has a statistically significant negative effect on investment. The study also finds that moderate leverage does not impact investment adversely. However, the analysis of subperiods within the sample considered (2005-2008 and 2009-2014) shows that (a) in the precrisis period (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) overindebtedness does not affect investment and (b) in the postcrisis period (which is the focus of this article) both high and low levels of indebtedness have a negative impact on investment. The authors explain the difference in the results obtained for the precrisis and postcrisis period on the basis of stronger financial constraints and higher levels of risk aversion.
In the case of Latin America, the available evidence indicates the debtto-equity or debt-to-assets ratios tend to be higher than those obtained for European economies. A study undertaken for the period 1990-2002 for the same set of countries that we use in this article (i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) shows that the average debt-to-asset ratio is 0.96, 1.70, 0.33, 0.47, 0.69, and 1.04, respectively, for each of these countries. The evidence also shows that the standard deviation is much higher than that found for European firms, with an average of 11.8 for the above set of Latin American countries (Soares Terra 2009).
A more recent study (Caceres and Rodriguez Bastos 2016) , using a sample of over 500 nonfinancial firms from seven Latin American countriesArgentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Peru for the period covering the period 2005-2015-finds that the debt-to-asset and debt-to-equity ratios stand at 58% on average. Another study (Alfaro et al. 2017 ) undertaken for 26 countries for the period 1992-2014 with a maximum of 8,286 firms, including the six Latin American countries contemplated in the present study, finds that the debt-to-equity ratio in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru hovers around 50%, whereas for Chile it is close to 80% (Tables 6 and 7) .
The distinction between bond-issuing and nonbond-issuing firms shows that the latter have much lower debt-to-equity ratios. For the period 2009-2016, the median debt-to-equity ratio for nonbond-issuing firms was 55% whereas for bond-issuing firms it was 82%. The percentage of bond-7 Debt and assets exclude intercompany loans. Debt includes loans, securities, and insurance technical reserves.
issuing firms that are above the median values tends to be always higher than that of nonbond-issuing firms (on average 67% and 45% respectively, for the period 2010-2016).
We applied the 80% debt-to-assets criterion used by Gebauer, Setzer, and Westphal (2017) to determine whether a firm can be classified in the overleveraged category, which roughly coincides with the median for bond-issuing firms and also with our threshold estimate described in the financial situation of the non-financial corporate sector and its macroeconomic implications.
The results show that over the period 2009-2016, the percentage of nonbond-issuing firms whose debt-to-equity ratios are above 80% and that as a consequence are overleveraged increased from 28.6% to 40.7%. A similar trend is found for bond-issuing firms (39.5% in 2009 and 52% in 2016) and the percentage of bond-issuing firms whose debt-to-equity ratios are higher than 80% is higher than that of the nonbond-issuing firms for all years.
Interest coverage ratio
Another indicator considered is the interest coverage ratio (i.e., earnings before interest and tax divided by interest), which is an indicator of the facility with which a company can pay interest on its outstanding debt, and the extent to which a firm relies on short-term debt to pay its obligations.
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As with the debt-to-equity ratio there is no absolute threshold for the interest coverage ratio. Similarly, we think a useful benchmark is to determine whether the ratio is above or below 1. Values below 1 may be an indication of a weaker financial position.
The data shows ( Table 5) that, on average, the interest coverage ratio is above two for the period under consideration for both the nonbond-issuing and bond-issuing firms (2.2 and 2.1, respectively). The percentage of bond-issuing firms that are below the median tends to be somewhat higher than in the case of nonbond-issuing firms (42% and 39%, respectively, on average for 2010-2016).
The comparison with the interest coverage ratio threshold shows that, on average, roughly 30% of firms, both bond-issuing and nonbond-issuing, have an interest coverage ratio that is below 1 for the period under consideration and that this percentage has declined over time for nonbondissuing firms (38.5% of the total for 2009 and 31.3% of the total for 2016). In the case of bond-issuing firms the percentage of firms whose coverage ratio is below one increased slightly from 27% to 29% of the total during the same period.
The interest coverage ratio can also be used as an indicator of liquidity risk.
Profitability
Turning to profitability, the results show that bond-issuing firms have, on average, a higher return on equity (ROE) and net profit margin (8.22% and 7.87%, respectively) than nonbond-issuing firms (4.85% and 4.65%, respectively).
The evidence also shows a fall in profitability for both nonbond-issuing and bond-issuing firms. In the period 2009-2010, 47.1% of bond-issuing firms experienced a decline in their ROE. In the period 2011-2016, 62.5% of bond-issuing firms registered a fall in their ROE. Nonbond-issuing firms show a similar behavior.
At a more detailed level the sectors that exhibit the highest percentage of firms simultaneously showing a QR below 1, a debt-to-equity ratio above 80%, and a decline in ROE include, among others, retailers, automobiles, energy, construction, food and beverages, and industry (see Table 8 ). These sectors account for roughly 50% of expenditures on fixed assets and longterm investment.
Nonfinancial corporate debt and financial fragility
The results based on financial ratios were complemented with a Minskyan analysis of financial fragility. According to Minsky, the scale of financial robustness or fragility depends on the mixture of hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance. As the proportion of hedge financing decreases and that of speculative and Ponzi finance increase, the financial structure becomes more fragile (Minsky 1986, 44) . Financial fragility can characterize any economic sector or agent, including the household, financial, and nonfinancial corporate sectors (Minsky 1986, 221) (Table 9) .
Hedge finance refers to a situation where the gross capital income of an economic unit (defined as gross profits before taxes minus interest paid on business debts) "exceeds by some margin the payment commitments due to debts in every relevant period over the horizon given by the debts now on the books and the borrowings that must be made if expected gross capital income is to be earned" (Minsky 1982, 38) . Speculative finance refers to a situation where cash payment commitments on debts are greater for some periods than the expected gross capital income. Speculative units can face the payments of interest on debt but not the principal. Ponzi finance refers to "speculative units with the special characteristics that for some if not for all near term periods cash payment commitments to pay interest are not covered by the income portion of the expected excess of receipts over current labor and material costs" (Minsky 1982, 40) . A Ponzi unit must "renegotiate its liabilities, restructure debt with longer maturities and lower costs, sell assets, or issue stocks in financial markets" (Torres Filho et al. 2017 ) to survive and transit from a Ponzi to a speculative financing regime.
There are a few studies that provide measurable criteria and a threshold for distinguishing between the hedge, speculative, and Ponzi categories. These include Mulligan (2013) , Nishi (2016) , Davis, Souza, and Hernandez (2017), and Torres Filho et al. (2017) , as summarized in Table 9 by highlighting the objective, data, time domain, definition, thresholds for financing regimes (hedge, speculative, and Ponzi), and measurement for each. 9 We use the first and the last available of these studies (Mulligan 2013 and Torres Filho et al. 2017) ) to classify our sample of nonbondissuing and bond-issuing firms for the years 2010 and 2015 into hedge, speculative, and Ponzi categories according to the criteria and thresholds provided by the authors.
The criterion used by Mulligan (2013) is the interest coverage ratio (IC), defined as: We also included Tymoigne (2010) in Table 4 because he provides an index for Ponzi finance at the sector level. Other studies (i.e., Schroeder 2009) focus on the economy in the aggregate. 
Source: On the basis of each of the authors' papers.
Mulligan establishes the following thresholds:
Because of the lack of availability of the net income variable, we used instead earnings before interest and taxes (EBITDA), to which we added interest expenses when available. Our estimates may give an upward bias to the interest coverage criterion, therefore underestimating the percentage of firms that are classified as speculative or Ponzi.
The criterion proposed by Torres Filho et al. (2017) is the financial fragility index (FFI) and it is defined as:
Where,
FO it ¼ financial obligations STD it ¼ stock of short À term debt EBITDA it ¼ earnings before interest; taxes; depreciation; and amortization:
On this basis the thresholds for hedge, speculative, and Ponzi financial positions are established as follows.
The overall results using both the interest coverage and the financial fragility index criteria show a prevalence of firms in the nonhedge category, while the financial fragility index criterion alone shows a decline in the percentage of hedge firms. This makes the nonfinancial corporate sector of the countries under study vulnerable to changes in the existing conditions in financial markets.
More specifically the computations of the interest coverage criterion show that, in the case of nonbond-issuing firms, the percentage of hedge finance firms is smaller than that of speculative or Ponzi finance (18.7% and 17.3% for hedge; 44.7% and 44.4% for speculative; and 36.6% and 38.2% for Ponzi for 2010 and 2015, respectively). By comparison, bond-issuing firms show a much higher percentage of Ponzi situations (73.6% and 69.4% of the total for 2010 and 2015, respectively) relative to nonbond-issuing firms (36.6% and 38.2% of the total for 2010 and 2015, respectively) ( Table 10) .
The computations for the financial fragility index criterion reveal that for 2010 and 2015, nonbond-issuing firms barely experienced changes in their financial position. Contrarily, bond-issuing firms witnessed a decline in firms characterized by a hedge regime (51.9% and 44.1% of the total, respectively, for 2010 and 2015) and a large increase in the percentage of speculative-type firms (15.9% and 25.8% of the total, respectively, for 2010 and 2015).
The financial situation of the nonfinancial corporate sector and its macroeconomic implications
The deterioration in the financial situation of the nonfinancial corporate sector and, in particular, of the segment consisting of bond-issuing firms can have significant macroeconomic implications via overleveraging and also through changes in external financial conditions, as these firms represent a large percentage of total assets for the whole spectrum of firms, whether considered at the country level or by sector of economic activity. These firms are among those that have the highest capitalization ratios for all countries considered. Moreover, these firms also account for an important share of fixed tangible assets and long-term investment and this has increased in the period 2010-16. (2013) and Torres et al. (2017) .
Overleveraging can result in a negative relationship between debt and investment. The factors that can account for this negative relationship include: higher interest payments, which subtract resources from being used for investment; a higher risk profile, which increases the difficulty of obtaining funding; and the desire to repair weak balance sheets and to build a buffer against illiquidity or possible default.
Firms finance their capital expenditure and investment from internal (retained earnings) and external funds. To the extent that firms use external sources of funding, debt and leverage should expand with higher levels of capital expenditure and funding. If firms do not face constraints on their external financing there should not be a relationship between their cash flow, liquid holdings (determined in part by retained earnings), and investment.
10 However, when firms pass a certain debt threshold they may feel more financially constrained and as a result may increase their retained earnings and cash holdings to protect themselves against illiquidity and ultimately insolvency. As a result, beyond a certain leverage threshold the relation between cash flow and investment should be negative.
Changes in external interest rates can also affect investment plans. When international interest rates rise, thus increasing the differential with domestic rates, the local monetary authorities will feel tempted, and in fact may be forced, to increase the cost of borrowing for firms that obtain mainly local funding.
The firms that borrow in the international capital markets (i.e., bondissuing firms) may also see their external funding options curtailed. Because of the inverse relationship between interest rates and the present value of a bond, an increase in interest rates translates into a fall in the price of a bond. Thus, any expectation of an increase in interest rates will lead to a reduction in the holdings of bonds to avoid a capital loss. This can translate into a reduction of lending via the bond market. Both transmission mechanisms may be at work to contract firms' expenditures on long-term fixed assets and capital investment.
Recent evidence provided by Avdjiev et al. (2017) shows that bond flows are much more sensitive to changes in external interest rates than bank loans. According to their estimations for the period 2009-2015, a 25-basispoint increase in the federal funds rate translates into 57-basis-point drop in the growth rate of cross-border loans to the nonbank sector and 125-basis-point drop in the rate of growth of bond issues in the international market. This indicates that to the extent that firms that seek finance in international capital markets represent a large share of assets and expenditure in fixed assets and capital equipment, a change in the composition of financial flows toward debt may have rendered the economies of Latin America more vulnerable to changes in international lending conditions.
The importance of these effects can also depend on the composition of the financial account of the balance of payments. In the case of Latin America, the greater reliance on the international capital market (and more precisely the bond market) as a source of funding after 2009 is reflected in the change in the composition of the portfolio flows of the balance of payments of Latin American countries. Data available between 2001Q1 and 2015Q4 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico show two important trends.
From 2001Q1 to 2008Q4 (the year prior to that during which the effects of the GFC were felt in Latin America), the volume of loans exceeded bond flows by a two-to-one margin. In the case of the nonfinancial corporate sector the differences between bank loans and bond flows were even greater. In the period running from 2001Q1 to 2007Q4, the volume of bank loans represented five times the value of bond flows. Between 2008Q1-2008Q4 the volume of bank loans represented eight times the value of bond flows. After the fallout from the GFC, which was reflected in a sharp drop in both bond flows and bank loans, the former expanded more rapidly than the latter. At the end of 2009, the value of bank loans was more than double that of bonds (US$12 billion and US$5 billion dollars). Between 2010Q1 and 2015Q4, bond flows expanded from US$0.5 billion to US$111.9 billion, reaching a maximum of US$152 billion in 2015Q3. For the same period, bank loans grew from US$0.27 billion to US$59.7 billion, with a maximum of US$61 billion in 2014Q3. In the case of the nonfinancial corporate sector, bond flows increased from US$4.9 billion to US$31.6 billion, whereas bank loans expanded from US$19.2 billion to US$33.5 billion for the same period.
To capture the relationships between cash flow (for different levels of threshold), external interest rates, and investment we use a panel threshold regression model developed by Hansen (1999) . The regression postulates a nonlinear relationship between cash flow (proxied by the variable cash flow and cash equivalents) 11 and investment, and a linear relationship between external interest rates and investment. The leverage threshold level is determined through a bootstrap method that computes the n-quintiles levels of thresholds to obtain the level that minimizes the quadratic error of the regression.
12
11 Cash and near-cash items (cash and cash equivalents) includes cash in vaults and deposits in banks, as well as short-term investments with maturities of less than 90 days; they can include marketable securities and shortterm investments with maturities of more than 90 days if not disclosed separately. 12 The regression to obtain the leverage threshold (c) can be divided in two parts:
The model allows us to measure both coefficients b 0 1 and b 0 2 ; that is to say the impact of x it for values under the threshold and above the threshold, respectively.
The equation was estimated using two different investment variables (the ratio of total investment assets to tangibles assets [I/K], and the rate of growth of tangibles assets). Besides the cashflow, the equation also includes as explanatory variables the external interest rate and ratios that capture the composition of assets and liabilities (the ratio of current assets to total assets ½CATAÞ; the ratio of current liabilities to total liabilities [CLTL] ) and also size (total assets). As mentioned above, the ratio of current to total liabilities is a proxy for the structure of debt (i.e., short-to long-term debt). We also included the ratio of EBITDA to assets ratio as a proxy for firms' profitability.
Our estimated equation is,
where,
it ¼ total investment assets to tangibles assets for firm i and time t. I 2 it ¼ tangible assets rate growth for firm i and time t. CF itÀ1 ¼ cash flow and cash equivalents to assets for firm i at time t À 1. D itÀ1 ¼ total debt divided by total shareholders' equity (leverage). c ¼ leverage threshold. CF itÀ1 I ðD itÀ1<cÞ ¼ cash flow and cash equivalents to assets for firm i at time t À 1 below the leverage threshold. CF itÀ1 I c<D itÀ1 ð Þ ¼ cash flow and cash equivalents to assets for firm i at time t À 1 above the leverage threshold. z itÀ1 is a vector of the following covariables: r ext tÀ1 ¼ international real interest rates at time t À 1 r ext t ¼ international real interest rates at time t CATA tÀ1 ¼ current assets to total assets at time t À 1. CLTL tÀ1 ¼ current liabilities to total liabilities at time t À 1. EBIDATA tÀ1 ¼ EBITDA to total assets at time t À 1 Size¼ log total assets at time t À 1 All variables in Equation (1) are expressed in real terms using the GDP deflator.
To remove the bias in the estimation procedure and results we excluded outlier observations and only included those firms that have data for the period 2010-2016. After cleaning the database, we are left with panel data by firm, with data for 261 firms in Latin America in the period 2010-2016 (Table 11) .
The leverage threshold was estimated at 0.77 with a 99% degree of confidence interval (Table 12) for all baseline specifications. This is consistent with the threshold used in section on the financial analysis of corporate indebtedness.
The detailed econometric results are presented in the appendix (Tables  A1-A2) for both variables representing investment (the ratio of total investment assets to tangibles assets [I/K] and the rate of growth of tangibles assets). For the ratio of total investment assets to tangibles assets (I/K) and the rate of growth of tangibles assets four models were estimated (see again Tables A1 and A2 ). The first model for each of these investment variables includes current assets to total assets (CATAÞ current liabilities to total liabilities (CLTLÞ the international rate of interest (r ext Þ; and the cashflow variable above and below the estimated threshold ðCFI ðD itÀ1<c Þ ; CFI ðD itÀ1>c Þ ), all lagged one period. The rest of the models add EBITDA, size, and the international rate of interest at a time t.
All the results show systematically that when leverage exceeds the 0.77 threshold level there is a negative and statistically significant relation (at the 1% level of confidence) between cashflow-to-assets and all the investment variables considered. That is, when firms are overleveraged they restrict their investment, while at the same time they increase their cash holdings to protect themselves against potential situations of illiquidity and insolvency. This result is particularly relevant for bond-issuing firms as more than 50% of these firms have a leverage over 0.80 (see Table 5 above) and it is these firms that account for a large share of total assets and investment.
In the case of the estimation specification using total investment to tangible assets the results show when leverage exceeds the 0.77 threshold a 1% increase in cash flow-to-assets is associated with a decline in investment of 0.25%-0.24% (Table A1) . Using the growth rate of tangible assets the estimated equation shows that when leverage exceeds the 0.77 threshold a 1% increase in cash flow-to-assets is associated with a decline in the rate of growth of tangible assets of 0.75% (taking the average of the estimated parameters in Table A2 ). The results also show that CATA has negative and significant effects when using the rate of growth of fixed tangible assets. According to our specifications, an increase in 1% CLTL ratio result in a decline of 0.04% in the rate of growth of fixed tangible assets. We interpret this to mean that an increase in current liabilities relative to total liabilities shortens the obligation payments horizon and firms will fell pressure to increase their liquidity rather than invest, at the same time, this makes firms' financial situation more to changes in financial markets.
As expected, the international interest rate (r ext t Þ has a negative for both the ratio of total investment assets to tangible assets and for the rate of growth of tangible assets. In the latter case, the rate of interest is also significant at the 1% level of confidence A 100-basis point increase in the international interest rate produces a decline in 0.07% in the rate of growth of fixed tangible assets (Table A2) .
Finally, size has a significant and negative effects for estimation including the rate of growth of tangible assets at the 1% significance level. Bigger firms (measured by asset volume) make greater use of the international bond market thereby increasing their leverage. The EBTA ratio has ambiguous effects.
Conclusion
The international bond market has become an increasingly important source of finance for Latin American economies, in particular for the nonfinancial corporate sector. A financial analysis of a set of 2,241 firms for six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) shows that bond-issuing firms are in a weaker financial position in terms of liquidity, solvency, and profitability relative to nonbond-issuing firms. A further analysis using Minsky's well-known taxonomy finds that the majority of bond-issuing firms are characterized by either speculative or Ponzi financing regimes and that, according to one of the criteria used, the percentage of hedge firms has declined for the period under study (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) , pointing to a process of increasing financial fragility.
The deterioration in the financial situation of the nonfinancial corporate sector, and in particular of the segment of firms issuing bonds, can have significant macroeconomic implications via overleveraging and also through changes in external financial conditions. The application of a nonlinear threshold model to a subset of the firms considered (261 firms) in this study shows a negative relation between cash flow and investment beyond a leverage threshold of 0.77 and also a negative relationship between international real interest rates and investment. The financial aspect of investment has not been duly analyzed in the case of Latin America. Our results may explain in part why the countries included in this sample have witnessed declines in the rate of growth of investment since 2012-2013, which is part of the reason why they have also registered low growth. The analysis provided in the paper also shows the need to include the international bond market in the transmission mechanisms that analyze the monetary and financial impulses from developed economies to Latin American economies. 
